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INTRODUCTION

The recent decision by the Supreme Court in the vanguard
tobacco product liability case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., ' highlights the timeliness of this article. Both the plaintiff, the tobacco
victim, and the defendant, the tobacco industry, petitioned the
Court for certiorari, demonstrating Cipollone's importance.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone was rendered as
this article went to press. We therefore encourage the reader to
evaluate the arguments contained in this article in light of the
Supreme Court's decision.
For years, the tobacco industry has been able to avoid liability to smokers or their survivors for injuries arising from tobacco
products. Suits brought against cigarette companies during the
1950's and 1960's, based on theories of fraud, negligence and
breach of warranty, 2 invariably were resolved in favor of the
I Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), rev k 593 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.NJ. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp.
664 (D.N.J. 1986), and 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 11l S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
2 See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (breach of
implied warranty, negligence, fraud and deceit by false advertising); Lartigue v RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (breach of implied warranty
and negligence), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962)(negligence and breach of implied warranty), certified
question answered, 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963), conformed to, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), different results
reached on reh 'g, 409 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911
(1970); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d. Cir 1961)
(negligence and breach of express warranty), rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 479 (3d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Cooper v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464
(1st Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (fraudulent advertising), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875
(1958).
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manufacturers or were dropped by exhausted plaintiffs who had
endured litigation that sometimes lasted for over a decade.3
Although courts increasingly concerned themselves with consumer protection during this period,4 the products liability field
underwent rapid change with courts differing on the theoretical
basis for their rulings. Further, courts and juries reacted with
considerable hostility to the allegations of smokers and their families that someone other than smokers should be responsible for
their injuries, considering the increasing public awareness of the
hazards of smoking.5
Adding to the confusion over what theories of law should
govern the claims of smokers and their families against the tobacco industry, the American Law Institute, in 1965, published
section 402 A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 6 Section
402 A provides in part: "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property."7
Section 402 A, which divided products into those which could
normally be used safely and those which were "unavoidably unsafe," explicitly excluded tobacco from the unavoidably unsafe
category.8 Because of this exclusion, tobacco manufacturers received additional insulation against liability by the use of the consumer expectations test, a test measuring when a product was
unreasonably dangerous.9 Under the consumer expectation test,
3 For example, in Pritchard,295 F.2d 292, the suit lasted for twelve years, going
through two trials and six appeals. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari in 1967, the plaintiff had long since died of lung cancer. See Donald W.
Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv.
1423 (1980) [hereinafter Garner, Cigarette Dependency].
4 Marcia L. Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV.
631, 632 (1987) [hereinafter Stein, Cigarette Products].
5 Both the media and the federal government began to focus much attention on
the potential hazards of smoking during the 1950's. Surgeon General Leroy E.
Burney, who had formed a study group on the connection between cigarettes and
cancer, concluded in 1957 that the evidence increasingly pointed toward a link between the two. See Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The "New Wave" in Smoking and
Health Litigation - Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 556 (1987) [hereinafter Crist & Majoras, New Wave.]. Edward R. Murrow's television program,
"See It Now," had a two-part series on smoking and lung cancer in the spring of
1955. See id.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

7 Id.

§ 402 A (1965).

8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, cmt. i (1965), provides: "[g]ood
tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may
be harmful .. " Id.
9 A manufacturer is not liable for injuries by his product, if not unavoidably
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an otherwise dangerous product might not be unreasonably dangerous if the public were warned of its dangers.' ° Unavoidably
unsafe products, on the other hand, were those whose utility outweighed their risks, and so long as a manufacturer provided appropriate warning, he could escape liability for injury."
Further shielding the tobacco industry from liability, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(the Labeling Act)' 2 in 1965, mandating health warnings on cigarette packages. 13 At that time, the tobacco interests were well
represented in Congress. The representatives from the six
southern tobacco producing states held a disproportionate
number of committee chairmanships in the House and Senate,
and by 1962, tobacco ranked fourth in the value of the country's
4
cash crops, grossing $1.3 billion for American farmers. '
The judiciary has also historically protected tobacco companies from liability. Five United States Courts of Appeals' 5 and
unsafe unless the product was defective in a manner that made it "unreasonably
dangerous." Comment i states: "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402
A, cmt. i (1965).
1o Id. § 402 cmt. j.
It Id. § 402 cmt. k.
12 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)(current version codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
13 The Act originally required the following words to be printed on each package of cigarettes: "Caution: Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health."
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1965). The warning
language required by the Act has been amended twice since its enactment. In 1970,
Congress changed the statement to read: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." Finally, in
1984, Congress decided to provide more detailed information by mandating four
different labels on the packages. The warnings state:
(1) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema and May Complicate Pregnancy.
(2) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health. (3) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature *Birth, and Low Birth Weight. (4) SURGEON
GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
14 Stein, Cigarette Products, supra note 4, at 644-45.
15 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'g 593 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp.
664 (D.N.J. 1986), and 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988) aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991); Pennington v.
Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
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the Minnesota Supreme Court' 6 have ruled that the Labeling
Act
7
claims.'
law
common
state
many
preempts
impliedly
In 1986, however, a federal district court bucked the historic
trend protecting tobacco manufacturers. In the landmark case of
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,1 a plaintiff successfully obtained a
damage award against a tobacco company for injuries and death
caused by the use of its cigarettes.' 9 Other courts continued the
counier-trend. Three years after Cipollone, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Forsterv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.2 0 developed a
new preemption test,2 ' further reducing the blanket immunity
that tobacco companies have long enjoyed. In 1990, casting an
even broader ray of hope for injured victims and their families,
the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in Dewey v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,22 that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act does not preempt state claims for failure to warn, design defect, or fraud and misrepresentation in advertising against cigarette manufacturers. Finally, a Texas Court of Appeals decision
held that the Act does not preempt state common law claims. 23
24
In what has been termed the "new wave" of tobacco litigation,
today's plaintiffs may be able to hold cigarette manufacturers
civilly liable, at least in some jurisdictions, for injuries cause by
their deadly cigarettes.
This article's purpose is to survey the field of products liability law as applied to the tobacco industry. It will demonstrate
how cigarette manufacturers have been virtually the only industry
that has historically escaped liability to consumers and bystanders injured by their products. Finally, this article will recommend
ways by which future plaintiffs may be able to recover for tobacco-related injuries.
Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), aff'g 623 F. Supp. 1189 (D.C. Tenn. 1985);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (1lth Cir. 1987).
16 Forster v.R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn.1989).
17 See infra notes 102-56 and accompanying text.
18 789 F. 2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), rev k 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), cert. denied
479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), and 683 F. Supp.
1487 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 111 S.Ct. 1386 (1991).
19 See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
20 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
21 See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
22 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
23 Carlisle v.Morris, No. 3-89-175-CV (Tex.Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1991).
24 See, e.g., Crist & Majoras, New Wave, supra note 5 at 551.

856

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW
II.

[Vol. 22:851

EARLY SUITS AGAINST CIGARETrE MANUFACTURERS

Professor Garner has noted that when cigarettes were found
to contain such foreign objects as worms, snakes, firecrackers,
mice and human toes, 25 cigarette manufacturers have usuallybut not always-been held civilly liable. 26 But when plaintiffs
have alleged that the harmful components of cigarettes, i.e., tobacco, caused them to develop cancer, 27 the tobacco industry enjoyed a long, unbroken string of court victories until the 1986
Cipollone decision.28
The earliest suit claiming that injury had been caused by the
tobacco in cigarettes occurred in 1956, when the wife of a lung
cancer victim sued the manufacturer for misrepresentation and
deceit.2 9 Her complaint alleged that her husband had been induced to smoke by the manufacturer's false advertising, which
included a daily newspaper advertisement in a local newspaper
stating that "20,000 doctors say that "Camel" cigarettes are
healthful," and a television and radio commercial stating that
30
" 'Camel' cigarettes are harmless to the respiratory system."
Although the manufacturer ultimately won the case on summary
judgment, 3 ' the case alerted the entire tobacco industry that similar suits might follow. In two negligence actions, Mitchell v.
American Tobacco Company3 2 and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v.

Hudson,s3 the plaintiffs were successful in getting the courts to
reject the manufacturers' contention that the statute of limitation
should begin to run when the harm occurred. Both courts
agreed that the tolling began when the plaintiffs discovered, or
should have discovered, they had lung cancer.34
Plaintiffs, however, generally had trouble proving foreseeability in their negligence claims. In both Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
25 See Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 3 at 1425.
26 Id. at 142 n.22 (noting that tobacco suppliers have occasionally escaped liability when their products contained bugs, tacks and steel blades).
27 See infra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
28 Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 3 at 1425.
29 See Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1956), on
remand, 158 F.Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 256 F.2d
464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
30 Id. at 173 n. 1.
31 The plaintiff failed to offer evidence in support of the alleged misrepresentations. Cooper v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aft'd,
256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
32 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
33 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963).
34 Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. at 411; Hudson, 314 F.2d at 783.
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Tobacco Co. 1 5 and Ross v. Philip Morris & Co. , 36 juries found for the
defendants because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the manufacturers had reasonably foreseen the dangers of lung cancer resulting from the use of their cigarettes.
The foreseeability requirement was addressed again in Green
v. American Tobacco Company.3 7 In Green, the plaintiff had alleged
several theories, including breach of an implied warranty and
negligence. During the litigation, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the issue
whether Florida law required the manufacturer to know, or have
an opportunity to know, of its product's danger to be held liable
for breach of the warranty of merchantability.3 8 The supreme
court determined that there was no such foreseeability requirement under Florida law3 9 and that the risk of injury for an un-

wholesome product was to be apportioned to the
manufacturer. 40 Despite the favorable ruling, the plaintiff lost on
the issue of causation. Even though the jury determined that
smoking Lucky Strikes had caused Green's lung cancer, the Fifth
Circuit, using a reasonable fitness standard, 4 1 added the requirement that the plaintiff prove that a significant number of other
victims had died from smoking the product. 42 Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit refused to admit evidence favorable to the plaintiff
during cross examination of the defendant's expert witness.43
Thus, after twelve years of litigation, which included two jury trials and six appeals, the tobacco manufacturer defeated the persistent plaintiff.
The plaintiff in Pritchardv. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. ,44 obtained more favorable judicial treatment but could not continue
the suit long enough to take advantage of it. In Pritchard, the
plaintiff sued on breach of express warranty and negligence,
317 F.2d 19, 22-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
328 F.2d 3, 4-5 (8th Cir. 1964).
304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certified question answered, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1963), conformed to, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964);
391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), different results reached on reh'g, 409 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1969)(per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
38 Green, 304 F.2d at 73.
39 Green, 154 So.2d at 172.
40 Id. at 173.
41 Green, 391 F.2d at 102.
42 Id. at 99-102.
43 Id. at 101-02.
44 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), aff'don reh'g, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 380 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1009 (1967).
35
36
37
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claiming that he had relied on the defendants' negligent statement concerning the safety of the cigarettes. The trial court dismissed the negligence count and entered a directed verdict on
the warranty claim.45
On appeal, the Third Circuit overruled the trial court and
remanded for a new trial.46 The Third Circuit suggested that
several theories might be used against the tobacco manufacturer:
first, if the plaintiff could prove explicit language, he might succeed on breach of express warranty; 47 second, the manufacturer
might be found liable for having failed to conduct testing to determine the health consequence of its cigarettes; 4 third, the defendant might be found liable for negligent failure to warn of
health hazards, 49 and finally, the cigarettes might be held unmerchantable if the plaintiff could prove he was injured by
them. 50
On remand, the court tried the breach of express warranty
and negligent failure to warn. 5 Although the jury found for the
plaintiff on causation, it determined that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury.5 2 Further, it found that the defendant
was not negligent and had not made any express warranties.5"
The court of appeals reversed the assumption of risk finding,
stating that the defense applied when a plaintiff knew about the
danger and expressing doubt that the plaintiff could have known
when the tobacco company had extensively advertised its cigarettes as being safe. 54 The court also clarified the reliance issue
in the express warranty claim, holding that the plaintiff need not
prove actual reliance on the advertisements because their natural
tendency was to induce consumers to purchase the product.55
Clarifying its order, the Third Circuit remanded for a new trial
on the liability and damages issues, 56 but
by then the weary plain57
tiff had voluntarily withdrawn the suit.
45 Id. at 301.

Id.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 300.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 296.
51 Pritchard,350 F.2d at 479-81.
52 Id. at 482.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 485-86.
46
47
48

55 Id. at 483.
56

Pritchard,350 F.2d at 96.

57 Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 3, at 1427.
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THE CIPOLLONE BREAKTHROUGH

On June 13, 1988, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,58 for the
first time, a tobacco company was held liable for injuries and
death caused to a consumer by the use of its cigarettes. The Cipollone jury determined that the cigarette manufacturer knew
about the health dangers of smoking before 1966, had failed to
warn of the pre-1966 health dangers and had breached express
warranties through its pre-1966 advertising. Although the jury
found that the plaintiff, Rose Cipollone, was eighty percent contributorily negligent, a finding which precluded recovery on the
failure to warn count under New Jersey law, it nonetheless
awarded her widower $400,000 under breach of express
warranty.
While she was dying of cancer, Rose Cipollone brought her
fourteen-count complaint against three cigarette companies on
grounds of strict liability, negligence, intentional tort and breach
of warranty. 59 She alleged that the companies had produced an
unsafe and dangerous product whose risk outweighed its utility,
and that they either negligently or intentionally failed to adequately warn the public of the dangers of smoking the product.
Moreover, she claimed that the defendants "negligently or intentionally advertised their products so as to neutralize and render
ineffective those warnings actually given, warnings which [were]
made meaningless in any event by the addictive qualities of
cigarettes.' 60
The defendants' response, in essence, was that their compliance with the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 6 ' immunized them from tort liability, 62 an argument which had, prior to
Cipollone, never failed to shield tobacco companies from liability." Judge H. Lee Sarokin held that the Act did not impliedly
preempt the states from compensating victims for injuries caused
by smoking or imposing liability on cigarette companies, even if
their cigarette packages contained the congressionally mandated
58 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F. 2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), and 683
F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1386 (1991).
59 Id. at 1149.
60 Id.
61
62
63

15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1341 (1988).
Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
See supra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
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warning. 64 Indeed, he stated: "the issues are within a different
field, that of products liability, the continued existence of which
was assumed by Congress, and left for the states." '65 The district
judge continued that "injuries to persons, property and the environment were wrong even before government declared that they
were wrong." 66 Finally, Judge Sarokin concluded that:
[Drug cases] among others, recognize that even the federal
government is fallible. The fact that it finds a product safe or a
warning adequate does not necessarily make it so. The private
citizen should not be deprived of the opportunity to establish
such fallibility and vindicate his or her rights to recover for
injuries sustained if supported by competent proofs.67
IV.

THE FEDERAL CIGARETrE LABELING AND ADVERTISING

ACT 6

AND PREEMPTION OF COMMON LAW CLAIMs

The Cipollone decision toppled one of the major obstacles

that confronted plaintiffs seeking to hold cigarette manufacturers
liable for the injuries caused by smoking: the preemptive effect
of the Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act.
A.

Background

In the 1950's, the federal government first became involved
in health issues concerning smoking. Surgeon General Leroy E.
Burney, who had formed a study group on the subject in 1956,
issued a statement that there was evidence of a link between cigarette smoking and cancer. 69 A few years later, representatives of
various health organizations implored Surgeon General Luther
L. Terry to investigate health issues related to cancer. At Terry's
behest, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare proposed
the formation of an advisory committee on the subject, and this
proposal was approved by PresidentJohn F. Kennedy in 1962.70
Two years later, the committee issued a 387 page report, determining that cigarette smoking is related to lung cancer, chronic
bronchitis, emphysema, cardiovascular diseases and cancer of the
64

Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1164.

65 Id.
66 Id. at
67 Id. at

1170.
1149.

68 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1341 (1988).
69 SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

1964) at 6-7 [hereinafter 1964

(U.S.

DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUC.

REPORT].
70C rist & Majoras, New Wave, supra note 5, at 557.

&
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larynx, and concluding that "[c]igarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial

action."17 1

As a vast amount of media

attention was focused on the Advisory Committee's report, several states began to pass their own laws to protect the public
from smoking, 72 and one year after its publication, Congress enacted the Labeling Act.73
The purpose of the legislation was twofold: to mandate the
printing of a uniform warning on all packages of cigarettes sold
in the country about the hazards of cigarette smoking and to protect the national economy by permitting the manufacture and
sale of cigarettes to continue. Many states had proposed their
own laws regulating the sale, advertising and labeling of cigarettes after the advisory committee's report had been issued.75
Congress, desiring to establish uniformity in an area affecting interstate commerce and wishing to avoid harmful economic consequences that could follow a prohibition on the sale and
manufacture of cigarettes,76 mandated that a single warning be
placed in conspicuous and legible type on every package of cigarettes sold in the United States to effectuate a balance between
the two goals.77 Originally, the required warning simply stated
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health".
The Act has since been amended twice, providing for
clearer, more definitive warnings. 78 The Federal Trade Commission was also given the authority to regulate cigarette advertising. 79 To assure uniformity of regulation, the Act provided for a
sweeping provision preempting additional warnings under state
law and prohibiting the states from regulating cigarette advertising. The Act states the following:
71

1964

REPORT,

supra note 69, reprinted in 1965 U.S.

NEWs 2350, 2351.
72 See Crist & Majoras,

CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

New Wave, supra note 5, at 557 n. 42, noting that following
publication of the report, public fear was so great that one state "dug up" a 1907
statute that made it illegal to sell cigarettes; and the city council of Eastland, Texas
proposed an ordinance imposing a $1,000 fine or three years in jail for smoking
inside the city limits.
73 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)(currently codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
75 See, e.g., Crist & Majoras, New Wave, supra note 5, at 557 n.42.
76 § 1331.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
78 See supra note 13.
79 15 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
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Preemption
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than
the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be
required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
80
chapter.
Subsection (a) is in its original form. Subsection (b), however, was
amended in 1969.81 As originally enacted, subsection (b) provided
that "[nlo statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarette,
the packages of which are
8 s2
labeled in conformity with this act."
Thus, at least until the Cipollone decision, the cigarette industry
argued successfully that under the preemption doctrine, compliance
with the Act's warning requirement immunized it from liability to
anyone who had chosen to smoke cigarettes notwithstanding the
warning.
B.

Preemption

Federal preemption of state action stems from the mandate
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.8 3
The Supreme Court has declared that "[i]n every case, the act of
Congress, or the treaty is supreme; and the law of the state,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must
84
yield to it."
To determine whether a federal statute preempts state law, it
is necessary to engage in statutory construction, examining first
the explicit words of the federal stature and then the congressional intent behind it.8 5 Thus, Congress may expressly preempt
state regulation by statutory language or it may impliedly do so if
such was the congressional intent and if Congress has indicated
80 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988).
81 Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1969)(currently codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1334 (1988)).
82 Id.
83 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2: Article 6 states: "[t]his Constitution and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
Id.
84 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.), 6 L.Ed 23 (1924).
85 Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1963).
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this intent by occupying the field in a particular area. 86 Federal
law preempts state law to the extent that it actually conflicts with
the federal law.8 7
Congress manifests its intent to supersede state law from a
"scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it" either
because the federal interest in the area is so dominant or because
the federal and state law seek to achieve the same purpose.8 8
Even if Congress has not entirely displaced state law in a particular area, state law may be preempted to the extent that it conflicts
with a federal statute8 9 or stands as an obstacle to the full
achievement of the congressional objectives9" There, however, is
a presumption that Congress did not intent to displace state
law, 9 ' which may be rebutted only by showing "pervasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably
'9 2
so ordained..
1. Express Preemption
No court has held that the Labeling Act expressly preempts
94
state common law claims. 9 3 The appellate court in Cipollone
summarily concluded that the preemption provision contained in
15 U.S.C. § 1334 did not expressly preempt state common law
claims and also noted that although the provision explicitly prohibited the state and federal agencies from requiring additional
warnings on cigarette packages, the language did not specifically
refer to the viability of state common law claims. 9 5 This result
was reinforced by the strong presumption against preemption
where traditional state powers are involved.9 6 The court pointed
86

Id. at 152-53.

87

Id.

88 Id. at 153.
89 Florida Lime & Avocado
90 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984).
91 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1982).
92 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142.
93 See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting
that all circuits agree the Act does not expressly preempt products liability claims).
94 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F. 2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), rev k,543 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1981), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp.
664 (D.N.J. 1986), and 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
95 Id. at 185-86.
96

Id. at 185.
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to the Copyright Act of 1976, 97 which contained a clause expressly prohibiting state common law claims, and to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,98 which contained a
savings clause expressly preserving such claims. 9 9 The Labeling
Act, in contrast, was completely silent on the subject, compelling
that court as well as others which subsequently addressed the issue to conclude that the Act did not expressly preempt state
claims. oo

2.

Implied Preemption

A federal statute may impliedly preempt state common law
claims under either an "occupation of the field" or an "actual
conflict" test. According to the former inquiry, state law is impliedly preempted by the federal statute if Congress so intended
and has manifested its intent by occupying a field in a given area.
Whether Congress has occupied a field may be inferred in any
one of three ways: (1) where there is a pervasive scheme of federal regulation in the area; (2) where federal interest in the area
is dominant; or (3) where the objective of the federal law reveal
the same purposes as state regulation.' 0 '
a. Federal Courts on Implied Preemption
The federal courts of appeals have differed on the application of implied preemption doctrine to the Federal Labeling Act.
The Third Circuit, in Cipollone, deemed it unnecessary to resort
to the Act's legislative history because the statute's language was
alone a sufficiently clear expression of Congress's intent.'
Rather, the Cipollone court focused first on the issue "whether
Congress intended to occupy the field relating to cigarettes and
health to the exclusion of state law product liability actions ...." 103 The court found that Congress clearly intended to
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1972).
29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982).
99 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185 n.5.
100 Id. at 186; accord Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230,234
(6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620, 625 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11 th Cir. 1987); Forster v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 1989).
101 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), revg, 543 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp.
664 (D. N.J. 1986), and 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D. N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, I IlS. Ct. 1386 (1991).
102 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186.
103 Id.
97
98
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occupy the field, as evidenced by the "sweeping language" of the
preemption provision and by its statement of purpose to "establish 'a comprehensive Federal program' with respect to labeling
and advertising regulation"'10 4 Because, however, the plaintiff's
tort action concerned "rights and remedies traditionally defined
solely by state law,"' 01 5 the Third Circuit took a "restrained view"
of congressional intent to preempt the field, finding that the
scheme of the act was not "so pervasive" or the federal interest
"so dominant" as to eradicate all of the [plaintiffs'] claims.' °6
The court next examined the extent to which the plaintiff's
state common law claims actually conflicted with the purposes
and effects of the federal law. In articulating a "balance of purpose" theory, the court stated that the Labeling Act represents a
precisely drafted balance between the goals of warning citizens of
the dangers of cigarette smoking and preserving the interest of
the domestic economy. 0 7 Applying this theory, the court concluded that state law claims for failure to comply with advertisement, warning and promotion requirements other than those
addressed in the Act have the result of upsetting the Act's equilibrium, and thus actually conflict with the federal law.' 0 8 The
Third Circuit then remanded to the district court the issue of
which common law claims were not preempted by the Act in light
of its decision.' 0 9
On remand, the district court held that the Act preempted
plaintiffs' claims of failure to warn, express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud to the extent that
they challenged the manufacturer's advertising, public relations
and promotional activities before the effective date of the Act;
not preempted, however, were the design defect and risk utility
claims." o But in a later pretrial ruling, the court deemed the
risk utility claims barred by the retroactive application of the New
Jersey Products Liability Act.'
On appeal for the second time,
the Third Circuit disagreed, but stated that it would follow the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in the pending case of
104

Id.

105 Id.
106 Id.
107

Id. at 187.

108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669-75 (D. N.J. 1986), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 893 F. 2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, I llS. Ct. 1386 (1991).
111 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d at 553 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 1386 (1991). See also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(2) (West 1987).
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Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. "12
The following year in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., the First
Circuit likewise found that the Labeling Act impliedly preempted
state common law claims for inadequate warning." 13 Like the Cipollone court, the First Circuit found Congress's preemptive intent so clear that it did not need to examine the Act's legislative
history. The Palmer court was not so restrained, however, in applying a balance of purpose analysis. Not only did that court find
that Congress had drawn a careful balance of the Act's competing purposes-"health protection [through education] and trade
protection,""14 but that Congress had also measured the relative
weight of the policies when it stated that "the federal warning
should protect commerce 'to the maximum extent' consistent
with its health policy."' 1' 5 The court then concluded that Congress could not have intended any one jury in any one state to
upset the balance" 6 and that the Supremacy Clause, as enforced
via the preemption doctrine, prohibited upsetting this
equilibrium.' 17
Such strong language has been used by cigarette manufacturers who argue that all common law claims tip the Labeling
Act's careful balance."" Indeed, one lower court has even construed Palmer to mean that all of the plaintiffs post-1965 claims
were impliedly preempted by the Act.19
"
The Fifth Circuit however, narrowed its preemption holding on appeal,
concluding
120
that a strict liability claim was not preempted.
The Eleventh Circuit' 2' adopted the reasoning of Cipollone in
Stephen v. American Brands, Inc. 122 The Sixth Circuit 23 relied on
both Cipollone and Palmer in holding that failure to provide ade112 225 N.J. Super. 375, 542 A.2d 919 (App. Div.), appeal granted, 113 N.J. 379,
550 A. 2d 482 (1988); Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 578.
''3 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), sub nom., Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989).
114 Palmer, 825 F.2d at 625-26.
115 Id. at 626 (citation omitted).
116 825 F.2d at 626.

'"7

Id.

118 Carolyn Brue-Legried, Comment, Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: Minnesota

Supreme Court Gives the Green Light to Cigarette Plaintifs, 74 MINN. L. REV. 839, 855 n.
97 (1990) [hereinafter Green Light].
119 Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F. 2d 414, 418-19 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1989).
120
121

Id. at 427.

Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, (11 th Cir. 1987).
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988).
123 Id.
122
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quate warnings was preempted by the Act.' 24 Likewise, state
courts have tended to follow either the Cipollone or Palmer
analysis. 125
b.

State Courts on Implied Preemption

Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that the Cigarette Labeling Act does not prevent
state law from providing redress to injured parties. Thus in Minnesota, claims for misrepresentation, strict liability for unsafe design, breach of express and implied warranties and for
negligence are not preempted, provided the claims can be
proven without resort to allegations of inadequacy of warnings. 126 In developing its own test for implied preemption in the
Forster decision, 27 the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the Cipollone court's "propriety" test.' 28 The Forster test is twofold:
preempted are those claims that challenge "the adequacy of cigarette advertising or promotion with respect to smoking and
health" and those that challenge the effect of that cigarette advertising or promotion on the federal label. 129 Effectively, only
claims that implicate failure to warn or inadequacy of warning are
preempted under the Forster test.
Although the trial court, on remand, ultimately dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint on the merits, 13° one commentator has
suggested that the Forster test should supersede Cipollone and
Palmer as the universal model for determining state common law
claims which endure the Cigarette Labeling Act.'' The commentator reasoned that:
Forster correctly limits the Labeling Act's preemptive reach to
failure to warn claims. Limited preemption properly matches
Brue-Legried, supra note 118, at 856.
See Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 375, 380,
542 A.2d 919, 921 (App. Div. 1988) for published state court decisions and federal
authority following Cipollone; see also Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 769
S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), and Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989), for federal and state court decisions following
Palmer.
126 Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 655.
124
125

127

Id.

Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660 (referring to Cipollone's preemption of state claims
that challenge "the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and
promotion of cigarettes).
129 Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660; Comment, Green Light, supra note 113, at 865.
130 Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Feb. 13, 1990).
131 Brue-Legied, supra note 118, at 865.
128
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Congress's intent in the Labeling Act. Further, Forstercorrects
several problems with Cipollone and Palmer cases and their
progeny: it preempts fewer claims, rejects the overly broad
application of balancing reasoning and properly weighs the
presumption against preemption. Finally, the Forster decision
makes good policy sense by allowing injured plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their claims.'" 2
Strikingly expanding the break from federal and state court precedent, both New Jersey and Texas state courts have ruled that the
Labeling Act does not preempt any state common law claims. In
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,"33 The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that failure to warn and misrepresentation in advertising claims
arising after the Labeling Act's effective date are not preempted, nor
are claims based on design defect or fraud. While the supreme
court recognized that lower federal court decisions involving statutory interpretation should be accorded due respect, it noted that the
decisions were not binding per se,' 3 4 and disagreed with those
courts that found implied preemption of state law claims based on
inadequate warning under an "actual conflict" analysis.' 35 According to the Dewey court, preemption by actual conflict is " 'more an
exercise of policy choices by a court than strict statutory construction' ",136 Because state common law tort remedies advance rather
than impair the goal of providing information to the public of the
health risks of smoking, the Dewey court stressed that the only federal goal that might be thwarted by permitting state actions could be
the protection of commerce if such actions created incidental regulatory pressure conflicting with the goal of uniform regulations.
Analogizing to the Atomic Energy Act,' 3 7 the court noted that
Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp. 138 was germane because it suggested
Congress's willingness to countenance the indirect regulatory consequences of applying of state tort law despite preemption of direct
state regulation.' 3 9 Likewise, the court observed that, despite compliance with warning provisions of other federal legislation, includId.
133 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990). For a thorough discussion of Dewey and
preemption, see Jean L. Dusinski, Note, FederalCigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
Does Not Preempt State Tort Law and New Jersey Products Liability Law Does Not Apply
132

Retroactively, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 193 (1991).
134 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 80, 577 A.2d at 144.
135 Id. at 86-87, 577 A.2d at 1247.
136 Id. (quoting Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.
1988)).
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 2284 (1988).
138

464 U.S. 238 (1984).

139 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 89-90, 577 A.2d at 1249.
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ing the Federal Insecticide Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, 14 0 the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 14 ' and the Food and Drug Administration's requirement that oral contraceptives provide precise
uniform warnings, 142 manufacturers have not been shielded from
state law liability, which has broader compensatory goals than the
Moreover, the court reminded that
federal legislation. 14
a
"[s]imilarly, in this case, New Jersey jury could decide that a cigarette manufacturer, rather than an injured party, ought to bear the
cost of injuries that could have been prevented with a more detailed
14 4
warning label than that required under the Cigarette Act."'
A Texas Court of Appeals reached a decision similar to Dewey in
Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc. 14' Applying a heightened presumption
against preemption and noting that state courts are not bound by
decisions of the lower federal courts, the Carlisle court identified six
claims
factors which led it to conclude that none of the plaintiffs'
146
against the manufacturer were preempted by the Act:
(1) The "frustrating" effect of such claims on congressional
goals is speculative; (2) Avoiding divisive labeling regulations
is the secondary goal of the Act; the primary goal is informing
the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking permitting common-law tort claims; (3) A holding that the plaintiffs claims are
preempted would leave them without any remedy for the defendants' allegedly tortious conduct; (4) Congress could easily
have expressly preempted common-law tort claims, but did
not do so; (5) The legislative history of the Labeling Act gives
no indication that Congress intended to preempt common-law
tort claims; and (6) The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act of 1986 evinces congressional 1 intent
47
that common-law tort claims would not be preempted.
The Carlisle court further identified flaws in the Third Circuit's reasoning in Cipollone and the First Circuit's treatment of the preemp140

7 U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136(y) (1988).

141

15 U.S.C. §§ 1261 to 1277 (1988).

43 Fed. Reg. 4220 (1978); 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (a)(2)(1) (1984).
143 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 92-93, 577 A.2d at 1250-51.
144 Id. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250.
145 No. 3-89-175 CV, 1991 WL 12469 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1991). Plaintiffs in
Carlisle,two persons alleging injuries and two widows alleging wrongful death, sued
in four separate lawsuits under five causes of action: failure to warn, design defects,
manufacturing defects, affirmative misrepresentation and civil conspiracy. The
four cases were consolidated by the trial court, which granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the preemption issue. Id. at 1-2.
146 Id. at 18.
147 Id. at 18-19.
142
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tion issue in Palmer.14 8
Agreeing with Professor Tribe's criticism that the Cipollone decision "seems hard to square with Silkwood" and the presumption
against preemption of state law claims, 149 the Texas court also
charged that the Third Circuit ignored the legislative history of the

Labeling Act and failed to address the argument that preemption
leaves the plaintiff without a remedy.' 50 Noting that the Fifth, Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits had also ignored the consequences of leaving
plaintiffs without a remedy, the Carlisle court attacked the answers to
the remedy claim given by the First Circuit in Palmer: First, that the
plaintiffs' smoking was voluntary; and second, that the United States
Supreme Court has often left plaintiffs without a remedy by preempting state claims.' 5 1
3.

Addiction and the Preemption Issue

The Carlisle court posited that the addictive nature of cigarettes excludes consideration of the assumption the risk doctrine
from playing a role in preemption analysis. The court noted that
the "addictive property [of cigarettes], if shown to exist, could
transform what was initially a voluntary activity into an involuntary one, effectively placing a prospective plaintiff in exactly the
same position as the plaintiffs in Silkwood and Laburnum. Indeed,
the failure to warn of cigarettes' addictive nature could be the
essence of a plaintiff's complaint."' 15
4.

The United States Supreme Court: Which Way on
Preemption?

It has been suggested that decisions such as Dewey and Carlisle open the door to potential suits by smokers or their estates
numbering in the tens of thousands.' 5 3 Cases in New Jersey and
Texas are already governed by conflicting law, and under diversity jurisdiction, no case in which R.J. Reynolds (a New Jersey
corporation) is a defendant, can be removed to federal court in
New Jersey. 15 4 Further, in other jurisdictions, plaintiffs wishing
149

Id. at 30-33.
Id. at 30 (citing

154

Id.

148

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480,
490-91 (2d ed. 1988)).
150 Carlisle, No. 3-89-175 CV, slip op. at 30.
151 Id. at 31-33.
152 Id. at 31. See also infra notes 220-225 and accompanying text.
153 Pet. for Cert. to the U.S. Sup. Ct., Respondents' Memorandum, Carlisle v.
Philip Morris, Inc., No. 90-1038 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1991)(citation omitted).
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to avoid the federal court death knell on the preemption issue
have avoided removal from state courts by naming as a defendant
an in-state retailer or distributor. 155 Thus, to avoid the conflict
that will inevitably recur between the federal and state courts, the
Supreme Court's upcoming determination of the preemption issue in the context of Cipollone is necessary. A ruling against preemption, urged by the authors of this article, is crucial, otherwise
plaintiffs will be left without any remedy, and tobacco will be
"virtually the only industry in which manufacturers will be able to
avoid the choice of increasing product safety, increasing
warn' 156
ings, or paying damages to injured consumers."
V.
A.

REACHING THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY: THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Duty to Warn

Outside of the tobacco industry, manufacturers and distributors have been held strictly liable for personal injuries caused not
only by defects in their products, but because of their failure to
warn consumers about the inherent conditions that make the
product unreasonably dangerous. 15 7 The duty to warn in a strict
liability case arises if the seller has, or should have, knowledge of
a dangerous use.158

The strict liability duty to warn, as usually formulated, and
under the

RESTATEMENT,' 5 9

is hard to distinguish in practice from

the duty to warn imposed by a negligence standard. 60 Even if a
warning is otherwise adequate, it can be rendered inadequate (or
more inadequate) due to representations that make the product
seem less dangerous, or otherwise mislead the user regarding the
nature or extent of the product's dangers.
In a 1983 case, 16 an electrical equipment manufacturer discovered a dangerous design defect in a high-voltage circuit
breaker. The manufacturer developed a modification that would
prevent the danger. The manufacturer sent a warning letter to
every one of its customers, notifying them of the problem, and
sent a repair kit to each customer. Despite these precautions, the
155 Id.
156

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

480, 490-91 (2d ed.

1988).
'57 Flaminio v, Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 753 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984)(applying
Wisconsin law).
158 Id.
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402 A, cmt. j (1965).
160 See Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1983).
161 Id. at 1314.
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manufacturer could be held liable if the jury found that the warning was unclear or if it was accompanied by misleading representations of safety,
which may have served to render the warning
62
inadequate.

More obvious examples of misleading representations can
be found in cases involving poisoning. In one case, 163 a woman
was fatally poisoned by fumes from a container of carbon tetrachloride cleaning fluid. Although the container had a "Caution"
message in 1/4 to 1/8 inch letters on two narrow sides, the court
found that the conspicuous display of the words "SAFETYKLEEN" in 1/2 to 3/4 inch letters on all four sides could have
been a negligent breach of its duty to give adequate warning."
The court was concerned that the word "safety" was so prominently featured as to exclude from the victim's mind that "provident fear" which has been characterized as "the mother of
safety. ' ' 6 ' In another case, 166 a manufacturer accompanied a
warning with misleading representations of safety, which the
court held may have served to render the warning inadequate.' 67
The duty of manufacturers to warn users of the dangers of
cigarette smoking has, in the opinion of some courts, been modified by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.' 68 In
Cipolone,169 the Third Circuit held that the Cigarette Act 170 federally preempts all claims against cigarette manufacturers based on
their post-1965 marketing behavior. 17 ' The Court held that the
Act preempts recovery on theory of failure to warn under state
law, based on the cigarette companies' advertising of cigarettes
or upon the adequacy of their warnings as to the hazards of
smoking on or after January 1, 1966.172 Conversely, the Court
162 Id. at 1321. The court left it to the jury to decide whether the letter constituted an adequate warning. A secondary factor in this case was that the manufacturer did not follow up the initial letter to ensure that the modification kit was
actually installed, thereby breaching its non-delegable duty. Id.
163 Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.2d 850 (Pa. 1945).
164 Id. at 55. The court stated: "[t]he word 'Safety' was so conspicuously displayed on all four sides of this can of dangerous fluid as to make the word 'Caution'
and the admonition against inhaling fumes and as to use only in a well ventilated
place seem of comparatively minor import." Id.
165 Id. at 55-56.
166 Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
167 Id. at 1345-46.
168 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)(effective January 1, 1966).
169 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted,
Ill S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
170 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 to 1341 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
171 Id. at 559.
172 Id. at 545.
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held that the defendant, the Liggett Group, owed a duty to warn
consumers of the health effects of smoking prior to 1966, and
would therefore be liable to smokers harmed by a breach of that
duty.' 73 The Court took judicial notice of the addictive nature of
nicotine,' 74 and noted that smokers who became addicted prior
to 1966 may be able to hold cigarette manufacturers liable for
75
injuries caused by their post-1965 cigarette smoking.'
The "decision and reasoning" of Cipollone' 76 was cited by the
Eleventh Circuit in a 1987 failure-to-warn case. 7 7 In Stephen, the
widow of a deceased smoker sued, in part, on a failure-to-warn
theory. The defendant answered that some of plaintiff's claims
were preempted by the Labeling Act. The district court denied
plaintiff's motion to strike that defense, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, relying on Cipollone.
It must be remembered that the Cipollone decision was made
by a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and is not per se binding
on state courts with respect to Constitutional or statutory interpretation.'I7 Lower federal court decisions are no more binding
on a state court than they are on a federal court not beneath it in
the judicial hierarchy. 7 9 When Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.'" 0 was heard by the Supreme Court of the State of New
Jersey, the Court made an independent analysis, with due respect
to the Cipollone decision. The Court held that the Cigarette Act
would not prevent a New Jersey jury from deciding
that a cigarette manufacturer, rather than an injured party,
ought to bear the cost of injuries that could have been prevented with a more detailed warning label than that required
under the Cigarette Act. We think that our citizens are 8entitled at least to the opportunity to present such a claim.' '
173

'74

Id. at 559.
Id. at 563 (citing U.S. Dep't Health & Human Serv.,

QUENCES OF SMOKING:

THE HEALTH CONSE-

NICOTINE ADDICTION-A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

(1988)).
175 Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 563.
176 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), rev' 593 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp.
664 (D.N.J. 1986), and 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988) aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
'77 Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11 th Cir. 1987).
178 Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
179 Id. at 79, 577 A.2d at 1244 (quoting Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower
Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 946-47 (1948)).
180 Id. at 80, 577 A.2d at 1244.
181 Id. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250 (citation omitted).
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The court cited other federal statutes and regulations, 8 2 which
require manufacturers to conform with specific labeling requirements, yet do not immunize the manufacturer of a hazardous product from failure to supply an adequate warning. The United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prescribes warnings to be
used on oral contraceptives to ensure that patients are "fully informed of the benefits and risks involved in the use of these
drugs,"' l8 3 and requires "precise and nationally uniform" labelling
in that respect.'8 4 Compliance with FDA labels on oral contracepSimtives, however, does not shield manufacturers from liability.'
ilarly, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) l8 6 requires
that hazardous household substances sold in interstate commerce
have a label containing specific warnings and instructions. The D.C.
Circuit, however, has held that the Act prescribes only the minimum
warning. Compliance with the Act would not preclude a finding of
8 7
negligence for failure to give additional warnings.'
The Dewey Court has therefore split with the Third Circuit, and
has maintained (in the State of New Jersey) a right of action against
cigarette manufacturers based on claims of misrepresentation and
failure to warn. 8 This decision will have limited effect in future
New Jersey cases, due to the 1987 New Jersey Products Liability
Law,' 8 9 which provides, in part, that in a product liability action arising from an alleged design defect, the manufacturer or seller shall
not be liable if
[t]he characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary
consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the
product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person
who uses or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is
intended. ..190

The revised statute would arguably prevent recovery in New
182 43 Fed. Reg. 4220 (1978); 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a) (1984)(labeling of oral contraceptives); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-77 (1988)(labeling of hazardous household
substances).
183 43 Fed. Reg. 4220 (1978); 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a) (1984).
184 21 C.F.R. § 301.501(a)(2)(1) (1984).
185 Dewey, 123 N.J. at 93, 577 A.2d at 1251 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. 1985)).
186 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-77 (1988).
187 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 93, 577 A.2d at 1251 (citing Burch v. Amsterdam Corp.,
366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976)).,
188 Id. at 100, 577 A.2d at 1255.
189 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987).
190 Id. § 2A:58C-3(a)(2).
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Jersey cigarette cases filed after July 22, 1987,'9' and especially in
those cases where the smoker began smoking on or after January 1,
1966.192 Despite the fact that the revised Products Liability Law
may bar recovery in future cases, the Cipollone court held that the New
Jersey Products Liability Law did not relieve the cigarette manufacturer of any duty to warn. 19
The holding in Cipolone, that common-law tort claims are preempted by the Labeling Act, has been criticized by both commentators and by the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit. The Cipollone I
decision ignored legislative history, ignored the fact that preemption would leave plaintiffs without any remedy and gave little weight
to the presumption against preemption. 9 4 Professor Tribe noted
that, in virtually every other industry, manufacturers have the choice
of increasing the safety of their products, increasing the warnings of
the dangers in their products or paying damages to injured consumers.' 9 5 He further criticized 9 ' the inconsistency between Cipollone
and Silkwood,"'9 in which the Supreme Court held that state common-law tort claims are not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.
The Silkwood Court in arriving at its conclusion noted that Congress
neglected to establish any federal remedy for plaintiffs injured by
such conduct, and concluded that "[i]t is difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."' 9 8
Equally telling is Chief Judge Gibbons' concurring opinion in
Cipolone II. Judge Gibbons concluded that "our interlocutory ruling
[in Cipolone I] on the preemptive effect of the Labeling Act... was
wrong as a matter of law, and should be overruled by the court in
banc."' 9 9 The judge further explained that the only reason that he
joined in the preemption section of the opinion was because the
panel was "bound by what I believe to be an erroneous opinion of
20 0
the Court.
Due to the inconsistencies of the Cipollone I opinion, and the
The effective date of the statute.
The effective date of the Labelling Act.
193 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D. N.J. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
194 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 131.
191
192

195 TRIBE,

supra note 156, at 490.

Id. at 490-91.
197 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
196

198

Id. at 251.

199 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 583 (Gibbons,J., concurring),
cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
200

Id.
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limiting effect of the revised New Jersey Products Liability Law on
future New Jersey cases, the recent Texas decision in Carlisle v. Philip
Morris20 may prove to be of greater precedential value. The Carlisle
Court reiterated that state courts are not bound by lower federal
court opinions interpreting the Labeling Act, although such decisions are persuasive.20 2 After making its own analysis of the arguments for and against preemption, the court concluded that there is
no basis for either express or implied preemption of common-law
tort claims under the Act.2 °3
The Carlisledecision refuted the logic of earlier cases and built a
solid foundation for its decision to allow common-law claims against
cigarette manufacturers, wholesalers and related entities, including
claims of failure to warn, design defect, manufacturing defect, affirmative misrepresentation and civil conspiracy.204 Citing Supreme
Court cases, the court noted that there is a presumption against preemption 20 5 and that "the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. ' ' 20 6 Public health and safety is
an area of traditional state control,20 7 therefore it stands to reason
that the Labeling Act would not preempt state authority unless the
Act clearly stated that intention. Even if the defendant alleges that
state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes
and objectives of Congress, the defendant must overcome the presumption against preemption in an area traditionally regulated by
the states.20 8 In ruling against preemption, the Carlisle court cited
six factors supporting its decision.20 9
In analyzing the preemption issue, the Carlisle court focused on
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

No. 3-89-175-CV, 1991 WL 12469 (Tex. App. Ct. Feb. 6, 1991).

Id. at 12.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 2.

Id. at 15 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Id. ("the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and historically a
matter of local concern") (quoting Hilisborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
208 Id. (quoting California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989)).
209 (1) The "frustrating effect of such claims on congressional goals is speculative; (2) Avoiding diverse labeling regulations is the secondary goal of the Act; the
primary goal-informing the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking-would arguably be enhanced by permitting common-law tort claims; (3) A holding that
plaintiffs' claims are preempted would leave them without any remedy for the defendants' allegedly tortious conduct; (4) Congress could easily have expressly preempted common-law tort claims, but did not do so; (5) The legislative history of the
Labeling Act gibes no indication that Congress intended to preempt common-law
tort claims; and (6) The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act
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the failure-to-warn claims, but noted that the presumption against
preemption was even stronger for the other claims. 210 Although it
is too early to tell whether the Carlisle decision will be followed in
other jurisdictions, its well-reasoned argument and its reliance on
Supreme Court decisions for authority should appeal to both state
and federal courts.
B.

Fraudand Deception, and Intent to Deceive

Prior to the 1971 government ban on tobacco advertising,
the tobacco industry was a major advertiser on American radio
and television. After the 1971 ban,2 1 ' the tobacco industry became one of the largest advertisers in America's newspapers,
magazines and billboards.2 1 2 It is reasonable to assume that cigarette manufacturers would not spend large sums of money on
advertising over a number of decades unless they felt that the
advertisements promoted the consumption of cigarettes.
In a 1956 decision, the First Circuit allowed an action in deceit to be pleaded by the administratrix of the estate of a deceased smoker. 21 3 The suit alleged that the defendant cigarette
manufacturer advertised that its Camel cigarettes are "healthful"
and "harmless to the respiratory system", that these representations were untrue and that the defendant knowingly made the
untrue representations. 21 4 The suit further alleged that the defendant intended that the deceased and other members of the
public should rely on the representations by purchasing the defendant's cigarettes, that the deceased did rely on the representations and did purchase defendant's cigarettes exclusively, and
that the deceased was "thereby deceived, defrauded and persuaded to use 'Camel' cigarettes [which resulted in cancer of the
lung, and the pain, suffering and damages for which plaintiff
prays for judgment]". 2 1 5 Although summary judgment was later
granted to the defendant because plaintiff failed to produce the
of 1986 evinces congressional intent that common-law tort claims not be preempted. Id. at 18-19.
210 Id. at 19.
211 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988).
212 Clara Sue Ross, Comment: Judicialand Legislative Control of the Tobacco Industry:
Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (quoting Media Advertising for
Tobacco Products, 255 J.A.M.A. 1033, 1033 (1986)).
213 Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956),
appeal dismissed on other grounds, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 875 (1958).
214 Id. at 173 n.l.
215 Id. at 174.
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allegedly deceptive advertisements, 1 6 this decision remains as
precedent for holding cigarette manufacturers liable for fraudulent representations.
.In a later Minnesota case, 217 a smoker with inoperable lung
cancer and his wife sued a tobacco manufacturer on theories of
strict liability, breach of warranty and negligence. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the Labeling Act preempts any
state claim that questions the adequacy of cigarette advertising or
promotion with respect to smoking and health, or which questions the effect of that advertising or promotion on the federal

label. 2 " 1 The court held that claims that are not based on a duty

to warn, e.g., strict liability based on a risk-utility theory, affirmative misrepresentation, or breach of warranty, however, do not
conflict with the objectives of the Labeling Act and are thus not

preempted. 21 9 Cigarette manufacturers, therefore, cannot look

to the Labeling Act to protect them from liability for affirmative
misrepresentations about their products in the Minnesota state
courts.
C. Industry Conspiracy, Failure to Warn, and Fraudulent
Concealment, as Revealed in Tobacco Industry Documents
Discovery documents obtained by the plaintiff in Cipollone revealed that the three defendants, Liggett, Philip Morris, and
Lorillard, which still deny that smoking is hazardous, had proven
to themselves by the early 1960's that smoking causes lung cancer. As discussed above, the documents also show that the defendants had discovered ways to make less hazardous cigarettes
but chose not to market these cigarettes. Perhaps the most egregious discovery, however, is the evidence of the industry's calculated and successful efforts, beginning in the 1930's, to confuse
the American public in general, and doctors in particular, about
220
the dangers of cigarette smoking.
The Cipollone documents include internal research and development documents which support Judge Sarokin's opinion that
the tobacco companies "intentionally and wilfully ignored the
216 256 F.2d 464, 467 (lst Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
217 Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989), rev'g in
part 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
218 Id. at 660.
219 Id. at 661-62.
220 Additional Incriminating Documents Released, TPLR PRESS RELEASE 1 (Tobacco
Products Liability Project, Boston, Mass., March 26, 1988 Supp.)[hereinafter
TPLR].
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known health consequences to consumers from the sale of their
products; that their so-called investigation into the risks was not
to find the truth and inform their consumers, but merely an effort
to determine if they could refute the adverse reports and maintain their sales."' 22 1 In 1988, the research director of Philip Morris referred to a "gentlemen's agreement from the tobacco
industry" regarding biological studies.22 2 In a 1971 seminar, the
same director discussed details of the industry's new "counterpropaganda" strategy. 223 There is, however, an internal Philip
Morris memorandum indicating that as early as July 24, 1958, the
company knew that heavy cigarette smoking contributes to lung
cancer. That memorandum warned the company that it should
manufacture a safer cigarette that delivers little or no tar and nicotine, without admitting a direct relation between smoking and
health.224 Other documents support Judge Sarokin's conclusion
that "the creation of [the Council for Tobacco Research] and the
work performed was nothing but a hoax created for public relations purposes with no intention of seeking the truth or publishing it," and that "the research actually conducted was unrelated
or not pertinent to the real health issues. 2 25
D. Private Discovery and Public Access to Industry Documents
Although the Dewey and Carlisle decisions have expanded the
tobacco industry's liability beyond that decided by the Cipollone
court, the Cipollone case will nevertheless have a dramatic impact
on future cases. This impact will arise because the documents
discovered in Cipollone will be available to future plaintiffs. The
industry can no longer exhaust plaintiffs by forcing them to endure the rigors of extended discovery. In addition, evidence discovered in future cases will now more likely be made available to
other plaintiffs.
Faced with a mounting body of adverse evidence and with
eroding defenses, the industry may be forced to adopt a new
strategy to preserve a market for its product. Perhaps the tobacco manufacturers will press Congress to pass legislation that
Id.
Id. (citing Cipollone Plaintiff's ex.s P-0503, P-0508 & P-0509). The change in
language between the three drafts of this internal memorandum may be construed
as an indication of scienter.
223 Id. at 2 (citing Cipollone plaintiff's ex. P-0504).
224 Id. at 2 (citing Cipollone plaintiff's ex. P-0510).
225 Id. at 4 (citing Cipollone plaintiff's ex. P-0506, P-05 11, P-0518, P-0520, P-0526,
P-0528 to 0533 & P-0538).
221
222

880

SETON HALL L, W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:851

will couple tighter regulation of the industry with laws that will
limit or eliminate its liability to smokers and bystanders.
E. Strict Liability
Relatively few Americans roll their own cigarettes; most
smokers purchase manufactured cigarettes.226 Cigarettes are
therefore a consumer product, which the user is anticipated to
and does receive without significant change in the state in which
it is marketed. 227 Any seller of cigarettes should, therefore, be
held strictly liable for physical harm resulting from the defective
condition or unreasonably dangerous nature of the cigarettes.228
Under the RESTATEMENT'S strict liability provision, it is not necessary to prove negligence on the part of the seller, nor is it necessary to demonstrate
privity between the seller and the injured
22 9
user or consumer.

This seemingly simple rule is complicated by the definition
and application of the terms "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous." Obvious examples of defective condition
are cases in which the product is contaminated by foreign ob23

jects2 3 0 or where the product contains a harmful ingredient, '

for example, a dangerous chemical additive. An unusual quantity
of an ingredient that is normally present in the product may also
be considered a defective condition.23 2
In a 1987 decision, 3 3 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held
that the ingredients of Pall Mall brand cigarettes were discoverable despite the fact that they were a trade secret of the defend226 Although an informal survey of several metropolitan New York establishments indicated that cigarette rolling papers are generally available, none of these
establishments sold cigarette tobacco to be rolled into hand-rolled cigarettes. It is
reasonable to assume that most rolling papers in this area are therefore purchased
to make non-tobacco cigarettes, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1)(b).

228 Id., § 402 A(1). The section states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
Id.
229 Id. § 402 A (2).
230 Id. § 402 A, cmt. i.
231 Id.
232 Id.

233 American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1987).
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ant.23 4 The official reporters do not carry any further history of
the case and, therefore, the results of this discovery are unknown.
If, however, discovery revealed that the cigarettes contained
harmful ingredients (other than normal tobacco), then this would
support a case for strict liability against the defendant. Other
plaintiffs can make similar discovery against any other company
that sells cigarettes in the United States. Future plaintiffs may
also use the documents discovered in Cipollone,2 3 5 which may include evidence of harmful additives in Liggett's cigarettes.

The

RESTATEMENT

considers that "[a] product is defective

and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not
sell the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are
greater than a reasonable buyer would expect.23 6 This aspect of
the Restatement's strict liability rule is open to interpretation,
which varies between jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court of California crafted a two-pronged definition of a defectively-designed product in its 1978 decision,
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.2 3 7 The Barker court emphasized that:
[A] trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is
defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's
design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
prove ...that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
2 38
outweighed the risk of danger inherent in such design.
The Barker test would allow a plaintiff to make a design defect case
on either a "consumer expectation" basis or on a "risk/utility" basis. A danger, hidden to the "ordinary consumer," would allow a
plaintiff to win on a "consumer expectation" basis. If the danger
was known to the ordinary consumer, the plaintiff could still win if
the danger proximately caused his injury, and if there was a practical
alternative design. Factors in the "risk/utility" analysis that would
be used in deciding the practicality of the alternative design would
include the gravity of the danger to be avoided, the likelihood that
the danger would occur in the challenged design, the mechanical
feasibility of the alternative design, the increased cost of the alternative design and whether the alternative design would be as useful as
234
235
236
237
238

Id. at 1057.
893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973).
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 457-58.
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23
the challenged design.
Risk/utility analysis is not universally accepted. A federal district court in Massachusetts recently considered and flatly rejected
the analysis. 4 ° In explaining its disallowance, the district court expressed concern that unless the purely hedonistic consumer's preference for a product is considered "utility", then a very large
percentage of manufactured products would fail a risk/utility analysis. 24 ' One can only speculate at what the court had in mind, but
potentially dangerous products such as alcohol, refined sugars and
saturated fats-harmful in large quantities and/or over a long time
span-are safe and useful in small quantities. Indeed, many
medicines contain alcohol as an essential ingredient, and sugars and
fats can play a role in a balanced diet, but the same cannot be said
about tobacco.
Although risk/utility analysis is currently a minority rule, it is a
legitimate method to decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. This kind of analysis can be found in Restatement section
402 comment k, which discusses unavoidably unsafe products, such
as the Pasteur treatment for rabies. The Pasteur treatment is very
painful, and frequently results in harm to the patient, but the treatment is legally justified because the only alternative is to let the patient die a miserable death. This is obviously a risk/utility analysis,
and the comment justifies such a product as an "apparently useful
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk." The key word is reasonable, which in this case means
that the risk is unavoidable, the risk cannot be reduced, the risk is
justified by the benefits and that the product is properly prepared
and accompanied by proper directions and warnings. Thus, the
roots for risk/utility analysis lie in Section 402 A, and risk/utility
should emerge as a "modern rule." Although one may argue that
this is the sort of analysis that is best left to the legislature, the
courts are often forced to make such decisions when the legislature
is silent. If the legislature is unhappy with the common law, it can
override the courts by enacting a statute.
Much has been made of comment i in Section 402 A, because it
specifically states that "[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
239 Id. at 455.

240 Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp 50, 52, (D. Mass. 1990), aff'd
Nos. 90-1297, 90-1400, 1990 WL 207437 (1st Cir. Dec. 19, 1990).
241 Id. at 53.
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'
dangerous." 242
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Dewey criticized comment i and concluded that a plaintiff may argue that a cigarette manufacturer has a duty to minimize the unavoidable, i.e.,
inherent, dangers attendant to cigarette smoking.2 4 The court further noted that the New Jersey courts2 4 never
adopted the "good to4
bacco" example given in comment i.
Section 402 A, comment i, and section 402, comment k, facially
appear to conflict. One resolution is to conclude that tobacco is
either unavoidably unsafe, which would subject it to the risk/utility
analysis of comment k, or is not unavoidably unsafe, which would
place a duty upon manufacturers to minimize or eliminate tobacco's
dangers. The tobacco-industry documents discovered in Cipollone
demonstrate that some cigarette manufacturers considered producing safer cigarettes as early as 1958.245 One such attempt to minimize or eliminate these dangers was R.J. Reynolds' smokeless
cigarette, which patent records indicate was available as early as
1964.246
Under risk/utility analysis, compliance or noncompliance with
governmental regulations does not absolutely determine the issue
of liability.2 4 7 If there is a government or industry standard relevant
to the product in question, the standard may be relevant and admissible (subject to appropriate limiting instructions), in performing a
risk/utility analysis.2 48 Compliance with a relevant governmental
safety standard is generally considered probative of non-defectiveness or non-negligence. 24 9 Although the Federal Trade Commission tests cigarettes and publishes 'tar' and nicotine measurements,
it does not set any kind of industry standards. One way that the
tobacco industry might seek to limit its liability would be to en242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, cmt. i.
243 Dewey v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239, 1241 (1990).
244 Id. at 98, 577 A.2d at 1253.
245 Richard A. Daynard, The Cipollone Documents, TRIAL, November 1988, at 52,

col. 3.
246 See U.S. Patent No. 3,258,015, "Smoking Device," claim filed Feb. 4, 1964,
patent issued June 28, 1986. See infra notes 290-301 and accompanying text.
247 Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., No. L-84-125, 1987 WL 6486 (Ohio App.
1987).
248 Id. at 29.
249 See Kaufman v. Meditec, Inc., 353 N.W. 2d 297, 301 (N.D. 1984), in which a
products liability reform act provision established a rebuttable presumption "that a
product is [not defective] where the alleged defect in the plans or designs ... were
in conformity with government standards established for that industry". But see
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft, 577 P.2d 1422 (Or. 1978), in which FAA approval of an
engine design was held not to be conclusive on the question of tort liability. Breach
of such a standard may be evidence of defectiveness or negligence per se. See Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984).
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courage the creation of government safety standards for cigarettes.
Companies that comply with these standards might be shielded
from liability.
The key element of the design defect claim made in Cipollone
was that the defendants failed to market a safer cigarette. 250 There
was evidence that all three defendants had developed cigarettes that
greatly reduced the risk of cancer. Defendant Liggett patented 2 5 , a
cigarette in 1975, that contained a palladium catalyst and a nitrogen
salt that is a normal component of tobacco, especially burley tobacco.2 5 2 These ingredients resulted in an almost total elimination
of tumors when smoke extract from the improved cigarette was
painted on the backs of laboratory mice in a standardized test. 253 A
1977 internal memo 2 54 discovered in the Cipolone case indicated
that Liggett planned to introduce the improved cigarette in the
Spring of 1978. The Cipollone documents revealed that the other defendants, Lorillard and Philip Morris, also discovered that burley tobacco and palladium catalysts could be used to manufacture safer
cigarettes. Lorillard considered using a palladium catalyst as early
as 1960.255 In 1973, a Lorillard memorandum predicted that "[a]
'safe' cigarette, defined as one showing little or no carcinogenic activity when measured by mouse skin painting.., should be realizable
[within] a total time span of five years."-256 Philip Morris also discovered that palladium and burley tobacco could be used in manufacturing safer cigarettes. Internal memoranda in 1962257 and 1963258
indicate that Philip Morris' scientists realized that catalysts such as
palladium could reduce harmful substances, including benzopyrene,
from cigarette smoke. Philip Morris' mouse-painting tests in 1965
proved that smoke from cigarettes containing only burley tobacco
did not cause tumors. A 1967 internal research memorandum
urged that Philip Morris publish the results of this study and introduce an all-burley cigarette. 25 9 Except for R.J. Reynolds' 1964 patent application and Liggett's 1975 patent application, all of these
250 683 F.Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
251 See TPLR, supra note 220, at 8.1.
252 Cipollone ex. P-508 (available from TPLR).
253 TPLR, supra note 220, at 8.1.
254 Cipollone plaintiff ex. P-507 (available from TPLR).
255 Cipollone plaintiff ex. P-701 (available from TPLR).
256 TPLR, supra note 220, at 7.
257 Cipolone plaintiff ex. P-609 (available from TPLR).
258 Cipollone plaintiff ex. P-610 (available from TPLR).
259 Cipollone plaintiff ex. P-617 (available from TPLR).
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discoveries were kept secret by the defendants until they were discovered by Cipolone.
Unfortunately for the Cipollone plaintiff, the district court held
that the "safer cigarette" design defect claim against the defendants
failed to offer proof that, had the defendants marketed the "safer"
cigarette in 1971, Cipollone would have switched to it and continued to smoke it until she ultimately stopped smoking.2 6
Even if Cipollone could have offered such proof, the district
court reasoned, she did not prove that failure to market the "safer"
cigarette was the proximate cause of her lung cancer. 2 6 ' In New
Jersey, the court asserted, a plaintiff must present evidence that the
alternative design more likely than not would have prevented plaintiff's injury. 262 Cipollone argued that, under the "lost chance" doctrine, she need only present evidence that defendants' conduct
increased plaintiff's risk of contracting lung cancer and that such
increased risk was a "substantial factor" in producing plaintiff's
condition. 26 3 The district court observed that the New Jersey courts
have not ruled expressly on the applicability of the "lost chance"
doctrine to product liability cases, and predicted that the NewJersey
Supreme Court would not apply the doctrine in the Cipollone case. 6 4
Based on this conclusion, the district court granted a directed verdict to the defendants as to the design defect claim. 26 5 Because this
ruling was based on a prediction of state common law, the same
facts could be used by a similarly-situated plaintiff in another jurisdiction and the plaintiff may obtain a different result.
Plaintiffs, in general, charging that cigarettes are defective and
unreasonably dangerous should try to avoid bringing suit against
manufacturers in Mississippi. In recent case, Horton v. American Tobacco Co. ,266 a Mississippi jury found the manufacturer and the distributor of Pall Mall cigarettes liable for the lung cancer death of a
two-pack-a-day smoker, but refused to award his family any damages
even though it found that the smoker had not assumed any risk.2 6 7
260 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (D. N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
261 Id.
262 Id. (citing Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 174, 484 A.2d 1234,
1244 (1984)).
263 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (citing Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 417, 471
A.2d 405, 415 (1984)).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 No. 9050-(E)(Miss. Cir. Ct. Sept. 24, 1990).
267 18 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. RPTR 1063 (1990).
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PLAINTIFF'S FAULT AND POSSIBLE REBUTTALS

Vast media attention focused on the hazards of smoking,
supplemented by public service broadcasts, publications and activities such as the "Great American Smokeout," make it difficult
for juries to conclude that injured plaintiffs did not assume the
risk of smoking-related injuries. How can plaintiffs convey to juries that smoking is not simply a matter of individual responsibility? One possible rebuttal, suggested by Professor Garner in
1980,268 and increasingly used by plaintiffs, is that assumption of
the risk requires an unreasonable, voluntary encounter with a
known risk,2 69 and because plaintiffs have become addicted to
cigarettes, their continued use is not voluntary. 7 ° Indeed, plaintiffs have argued that a cigarette manufacturer's failure to warn of
the addictive properties of nicotine 2 7' make cigarettes unreasonably dangerous.2 72 One commentator has even suggested that a
new strict liability action be devised, based on Professor White's
1982 proposal, for "intentional exploitation of man's known
weaknesses. ' 2 73 This tort would impose liability on manufacturers for injuries caused by the normal use of their product if the
2 74
product, used as directed, is naturally harmful and addictive.
When confronted with the manufacturers' defense that the
plaintiff was contributorily or comparatively negligent, plaintiffs
may rebut the charge that they knew or should have known of the
hazards of smoking by pointing to the plethora of material that
the Tobacco Institute continues to publish, which denies the
causal connection between smoking and any disease. 2 75 Furthermore, plaintiffs may also argue that the marketing practices of
tobacco manufacturers, which include advertisements showing
smokers enjoying the thrill of taking risks by windsurfing, sailing
and mountain climbing, effectively negate the presence of warn268 Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 3, at 1448-52.
269 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. n (1965).

270 Contra CRIST & MAJORAS, New Wave, supra note 5, at 596-601 (arguing that the
fact that over thirty million people have stopped smoking illustrates the fallacy that
smoking is addictive).
271 See, e.g., William Pollin, The Role of the Addictive Process as a Key Step in Causation
of All Tobacco-Related Diseases, 252 J.A.M.A. 2874 (1984).
272 Stein, supra note 4, at 653.

273 Id. at 669 (citing A.A. White, The Intentional Exploitation of Man's Known Weaknesses, 9 Hous. L. REV. 889 (1972)).
274 Id.
275 See, e.g., THE TOBACCO INST., CIGARETrE SMOKING AND HEART DISEASE 33-39,
(1983); THE TOBACCO INST., CIGARETrE SMOKING AND CANCER: A SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTiVE (1982).
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ings on packages of cigarettes.276
VII.

SMOKELESS TOBACCO

Although cigarette, cigar and pipe smoking may be the bestknown uses of tobacco, tobacco may be inhaled as snuff or taken
orally as "chewing tobacco." Collectively, these last two categories will be referred as "smokeless tobacco." Smokeless tobacco
delivers nicotine (and other chemicals) to the user through his
mucous membranes and, in the case of chewing tobacco, through
the gastrointestinal tract. Although smokeless tobacco products
have the virtue of delivering nicotine to the user without polluting the air with7 7smoke, they cause mouth cancer, gum disease
2
and tooth loss.
The Labeling Act, 2 78 which prohibited the advertising of cig-

arettes2 70 on radio and television since January 1, 1971, remained
silent regarding smokeless tobacco products. The makers of
smokeless tobacco took advantage of this opportunity to promote their products via radio and television advertising. Congress extended the radio/television advertising ban to smokeless
tobacco products 28 0 in 1986, but the industry used this 15-year

window to build up their market, particularly for "chewing"
tobacco.28 '
To inform the public of the dangers of smokeless products,
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act 28 2 (Smokeless Tobacco Act) in 1986. This
276 Plaintiff's attorney, Jack Dunbar, in Horton v. American Tobacco Co., stated:

"[Ilt's one thing to sell a dangerous product. It's another thing to sell it with reckless disregard."

18 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 1063, 1064 (1990)(citing No.

9050(c) (Miss. Cir. Ct. Sept. 24, 1990)); see also supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
277 See Pub. L. No. 99-252 § 3, 100 Stat. 30, 30-32 (1986); 15 U.S.C.
§ 4402(a)(1988); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 201 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].

278 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988).
279 Pub. L. 93-109 § 3, 87 Stat. 352 (1973)(currently codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1335 (1988))(extending the advertising ban to "little cigars").
280 Pub. L. 99-252 § 3(f), 100 Stat. 30, 32 (1986)(currently codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988)).
281 A recent innovation in packaging smokeless tobacco is to enclose it into little
single-use pouches that fit into the user's mouth, and can be conveniently spit out
in one piece. This can be compared to the packaging of tea into tea bags. Perhaps
a better term for these pouches (e.g., Skoal's "Bandits") would be "sucking
tobacco".
282 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401 to 4408 (1988).
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statute was patterned after the Labeling Act,283 and mandates rotating warning labels on smokeless tobacco products, warning
that they cause mouth cancer, gum disease, tooth loss and that
they are not a safe alternative to cigarettes.284
A noteworthy difference between the Labeling Act and the
Smokeless Tobacco Act is that the latter statute explicitly states
in the preemption section that "[n]othing in this chapter shall
relieve any person from liability at common law or under State
statutory law to any other person. 285 In other words, the manufacturers of smokeless tobacco cannot use the preemption section as a defense against common-law causes of action.
One must reconcile the existence of the savings clause in the
Smokeless Tobacco Act with the absence of such a clause in the
earlier Labeling Act. The Carlisle court,286 quoting a recent commentary,28 7 decided that "[t]he more reasonable interpretation
of this legislation, however, is that it expresses the ongoing, unchanging, undiminished intent of Congress not to preclude common-law causes of action for failure to warn against the tobacco
industry.

'2 88

Because the two statutes serve practically identical

purposes, there is no rational basis to believe that Congress intended to shield the tobacco industry from common-law action
for cigarettes merely because there is no explicit savings clause in
the Labeling Act. The Carlisle court's ruling on this point is
based, in part, on the documented record of Congressional intent. 28 9 This holding, if followed in other jurisdictions, destroys

whatever liability protection the tobacco industry thought it received from the Labeling Act.
VIII.

SMOKELESS CIGARETrES

As discussed in the Strict Liability section of this article, the
283
284
285
286
Feb.
287

15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
Carlisle v.
6, 1991).
Taylor E.

§ 1335 (1988).
§ 4402(a)(1988).
§ 4406(c) (1988).
Philip Morris, No. 3-89-175-CV, 1991 WL 12469 (Tex. App. Ct.
Ewell, Comment, Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can

ManufacturerBe Sued for Failure to Warn Even Though They Have Complied with Federal

Warning Requirements?, 20 LoYoLA L.A. L. REV. 867 (1987).
288 Carlisle, No. 3-89-175-CV, 1991 WL 12469, slip. op. at 29; Ewell, Comment,

supra note 287 at 918-19.
289 The Carlisle court reminded: "[The Smokeless Tobacco Act], for the most
part, simply extends that provisions of... the Comprehensive Smoking Education
Act of 1984, to include smokeless tobacco products." Id. (quoting 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7, 11).
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documents discovered in Cipollone have established that at least
three of the major cigarette manufacturers 290 developed cigarettes that greatly reduced the risk of cancer. 29 ' R.J. Reynolds

took its research further, and developed a smokeless cigarette,
which it patented in 1964292 and test-marketed under the brand
name Premier in 1988 and 1989.293

The Premier "cigarette" was not a cigarette per se. Instead,
the Premier contained an aluminum chamber that held nicotine
and various flavorings that were warmed and inhaled by the user.
Unlike other cigarettes, which produce tobacco smoke, Premier
would apparently have eliminated both environmental tobacco
smoke and many of the harmful substances that are inhaled by
the smoker. Thus, it seems that Premier delivered the nicotine
and flavor that smokers wanted, while eliminating many of the
undesirable and dangerous by-products. Assuming this were
true, a plaintiff could argue that cigarette manufacturers should
sell only the "safer" smokeless cigarettes, and that conventional
cigarettes are, therefore, defective. The Cipollone court reasoned
294
that those jurisdictions that apply the "lost chance" doctrine
would support such a claim, but predicted that New Jersey's
29 5
Supreme Court would not apply this doctrine.

A.

FDA JurisdictionOver Smokeless Cigarettes

It has been argued that the Premier was a drug delivery
mechanism for nicotine, and should have been regulated as a
drug. 29 6 Because nicotine is an addictive drug, one could make a
27
good case for FDA jurisdiction over smokeless cigarettes.

If

the FDA decided to gain jurisdiction over smokeless cigarettes on
this basis, a weaker but analogous argument could be made for
FDA regulation of all tobacco products.
290 Lorillard, Philip Morris, and R.J. Reynolds.
291 See TPLR, supra note 220, § 3.1; Cipollone plaintiff's ex. P-508, P-617 (available
from TPLR).
292 See U.S. Patent No. 3,258,015, "Smoking Device," claim filed Feb. 4, 1964,
patent issued June 28, 1986.
293 For further discussion of the Premier cigarette and its effect on the 1989
leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco, Inc., see Symposium-FundamentalCorporateChanges:
Causes, Effects, and Legal Responses, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1 (1989)[hereinafter Symposium].
294 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
295 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (D. N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 893 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
296 James T. O'Reilly, 4 Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulation: The Casefor Improving
Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 215 n. 90 (1989).
297

Id.
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Duty to Warn and Design Defect

It could be argued that the Premier was defective because
RJR breached its duty to warn users of these cigarettes' addictive
nature. Unless a plaintiff could claim that he became addicted to
Premier cigarettes, switched to regular cigarettes when Premier
was no longer available, and then was injured by the regular cigarettes, such questions, however, are now moot. In February
1989, RJR Nabisco announced that it terminated the market testing of Premier and indicated that it had no immediate plans to
introduce any product resembling Premier.2 9 8
C.

Industry Liability

It is reasonable to conclude that the cancellation of Premier
was based on RJR's restructuring after its acquisition by
Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts (KKR).2 9 9 Consumers who tested
Premier disliked its taste and the feel of its partially-metallic
body, 300 but RJR Nabisco had planned to spend $80 million in
capital investment on the cigarette in 1989.0 l Either management planned to continue stubbornly pouring money into a
hopeless product, or it planned to refine the product into a commercially viable item. The priorities of RJR's management were
obviously refocussed by its new owners, KKR, after the buyout.
It would seem reasonable to conclude that KKR ordered management to jettison the product to fatten the company's bottom
line. This conclusion should serve to increase RJR's culpability,
because a plaintiff may show that the company had the opportunity to perfect the safer Premier cigarettes but chose not to do so,
in the interest of saving money. An alternate theory for the cancellation of the Premier cigarette can be found in the Cipollone
"industry conspiracy" theory, discussed supra.
298 Peter Waldman & Betsy Morris, RJR Nabisco Abandons "Smokeless" Cigarette,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1989, at BI [hereinafter Waldman & Morris, Nabisco].
299 See Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEo. L.J. 71
n. 60; Betsy Morris & Peter Waldman, The Death of Premier, WALL ST. J., March 10,
1989, at BI [hereinafter, Morris & Waldman, Death of Premier].
300 Morris & Waldman, Death of Premier, supra note 299 at B 1.
301 Waldman and Morris, Nabisco, supra note 298; Symposium, supra note 293 at 569
n. 113.
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INVOLUNTARY SMOKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO

SMOKE:

DANGERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE,
AND NON-SMOKERS'

RIGHTS

Passive smokers are the blameless victims to whom cigarette
manufacturers may someday be found liable. While manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products may argue that cigarette
smokers now receive adequate warning and assume the risk of
smoking, this argument rings false when applied to nonsmokers
that are exposed to "second hand" smoke.
Cigarettes create indoor air pollution in two ways. From the
time that a cigarette is lit until the time that it is extinguished, it
burns continuously, emitting smoke and gases from the lit end.
This "sidestream" smoke and gas is released into the air without
any kind of filtration. The other source of pollution is the "mainstream" smoke, which the smoker exhales into the air. Since the
mainstream smoke is filtered by the cigarette's filter (if any) and
is further filtered (and partially absorbed) by the smoker's lungs,
it is not surprising that the sidestream smoke is more toxic than
mainstream smoke.30 2 When a nonsmoker occupies a smoke-filled room or other enclosed space, 03 he is forced to inhale environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), and becomes an "involuntary"
or "passive" smoker.3 0 4
In his 1986 report, 0 5 the Surgeon General confirmed that
ETS is harmful to nonsmokers. While the Surgeon General's
fact-finding may come as no surprise to most nonsmokers, it is an
authoritative piece of evidence that has been used by nonsmokers
to prove that ETS is a health hazard.30 6
A.

Employees' Rights and Employer Liability

At least in the workplace, nonsmokers have certain rights to
be free of cigarette smoke. An employer has a common-law duty
302 See Dukelow, Answers to Inquiry, Cigarette Smoke-Filled Room: A Hazard to Non-

smokers and Children, 223 J.A.M.A. 336 (1973). For example, sidestream smoke contains approximately 5 times as much carbon monoxide as sidestream smoke.
303 Examples would include airplanes, trains, buses and automobiles.
304 See Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 101-35 (1972) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S 1972 REPORT].

305 U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Human Services, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL Vii

(1986)

[herein-

after SURGEON GENERAL'S 1986 REPORT].
306 See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch.

Div. 1976).
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to provide his workers with a safe working environment." 7
Although there has been federal legislation governing workplace
safety, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA),3 ° this legislation does not preempt the common law. °9
Indeed, the OSHA legislation explicitly acknowledges concurrent
state power to act either legislatively or judicially under to common law with regard to occupational safety.31°
Nonsmokers have used their common-law right to a safe
workplace to obtain injunctions against ETS in the workplace.
The most widely-quoted of these cases is Shimp v. New Jersey Bell
Tel. Co. 3 1l Shimp was a telephone-company secretary who was

allergic to cigarette smoke, and was forced to inhale ETS created
by her co-workers. 3 12 She had severe reactions to the smoke,

which severely affected her health and forced her to leave work
physically ill on numerous occasions.3 1 3 Shimp produced medical evidence of these symptoms, which would go into remission
when she was in a smoke-free environment. 3 14 Shimp further
demonstrated that she had tried every avenue open to her
to get
315
relief prior to instituting her action for injunctive relief.
The Shimp court granted an injunction restricting the smoking of employees to the company lunchroom.316 The court noted
that OSHA did not pre-empt common-law state rights, and that
while the Workmen's Compensation Act barred tort actions for
damages, it did not bar injunctive relief against occupational
hazards.3 1 7 Courts do not need to wait until a hazard ripens into
an injury, and may use their equitable powers to afford an appro31
priate remedy to protect workers against occupational hazards.

Nor do they need an implementing statute in order to enjoin
conduct that interferes with the rights of an employee.3 19
One of the Shimp decision's useful and compelling arguments is that cigarette smoke is not a natural by-product of the
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319

Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 678 (1988).
Shimp, 145 NJ. Super. at 521-22, 368 A.2d at 410-11.
Id. at 522, 368 A.2d at 410 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(4)).
145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976).
Id. at 520-21, 368 A.2d at 409-10.
Id. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
Id. at 524, 368 A.2d at 412.
Id.
Id. at 524-25, 368 A.2d at 412 (citations omitted).
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employer's business. Case law exists, based on the proposition
that an employee assumes a risk, as ordinarily incident to his employment, where (a) the employee is employed in the handling of
materials that create dust as a non-toxic natural by-product of an
industrial process, and (b) the risk is either obvious or is known
to the employee.3 20 An employer need not fill the air of its offices with tobacco smoke to carry on its business, therefore, the
tobacco smoke cannot be regarded as an occupational hazard
that Shimp voluntarily assumed in pursuing a career as a secretary.32 ' Moreover, tobacco smoke is a toxic substance, increasing
the distinction between Shimp and the "assumption of risk" line
of cases.322
The Missouri Court of Appeals followed the Shimp decision
in Smith v. Western Electric Company. 3 " In Western Electric, the court
ruled that injunctive relief would be an appropriate remedy in
view of the tobacco smoke's effect on the employee's health, provided that the employee could prove that the employer breached
his duty to provide a safe workplace, that irreparable harm to employee's health was otherwise likely, that employee has exhausted
all other avenues of relief, and that there was no other adequate
remedy at law.3 24 The court noted that the employer had a policy
prohibiting smoking near its computer equipment, and that this
demonstrated that the employer had reasonable alternatives to
32 5
avoid the continuing breach of its duty to its employee Smith.
In an anomalous decision by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research, Inc.,326 an employee's action for unlawful discharge-due to her refusal to
work in a smoke-filled area-was dismissed because the employee did not introduce evidence of the hazards of ETS to nonsmokers in general. The court would not impose upon an
employer the duty or burden to conform his workplace to the
particular needs (i.e. sensitivity to ETS) of a particular employee,
but would only enforce a duty that the employer owed to its employees in general. In an odd maneuver, however, the D.C. Cir320 Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411 (citing Canonico v. Celanese Corp of America, 11
N.J. Super. 445, 78 A.2d 411 (App. Div.), certif den. 7 NJ. 77, 80 A.2d 494 (1951).
321 Id.
322 Id. at 523-24, 368 A.2d at 411.
323 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982).
324 Id. at 12.
325 Id.
326 462 A.2d 10, 14-15 (D.C. App. 1983).
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cuit mentioned the "plethora" of evidence presented in Shimp, 2 7
but chose not to take judicial notice of it. Therefore, it may be
likely that the D.C. courts will adopt the Shimp decision at some
future time.
An employer may not harass, dismiss or otherwise retaliate
against employees that seek relief from ETS or other workplace
safety hazards.3 28 In 1988, the District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled that such an employee could bring an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against her
supervisor.3 2 9
In view of the Surgeon General's reports regarding ETS, it
can be argued that employers are on notice of the dangers of
ETS and therefore have a duty to protect their employees against
these known dangers. As a result of a Washington state court
decision, employers that knowingly breach this duty are not only
subject to injunction, as discussed supra, but may be liable for
damages caused by their negligence.33

Because the Washington

plaintiff's ETS-related injuries were denied coverage under the
state's Industrial Insurance Act (worker's compensation), the
court held that the employer could be liable for money damages
in a negligence action.3 3 '
B.

Bystander's Rights and Tobacco Manufacturers' Liability

Cigarette manufacturers may be civilly liable to people who
inhale ETS under the theory of bystander liability. All states that
have adopted the theory of strict tort liability have extended the
theory to the bystander when called upon to do so. 3 3 2 Cigarette

manufacturers would be liable under the bystander liability theory for personal injury or property damage, based on the fact
that the bystanders were in the vicinity of a dangerous instrumen327

Id. at 15.

Carroll v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 697 F. Supp. 508, 511-12 (1988); Lepore v. National Tool and Manufacturing Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 540 A.2d 1296
(1988).
329 Carroll, 697 F. Supp. at 511-12.
330 McCarthy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 759 P.2d 351 (Wash.
1988).
331 McCarthy, 759 P.2d at 357.
332 Caruth v. Mariani, 463 P.2d 83, 85 (Ariz. App. 1970); see also Sills v. MasseyFerguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Klimas v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D. R.I. 1969); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451
P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Mitchell v. Miller, 214 A.2d 694 (Conn. 1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 113
N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965).
328
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tality furnished by a manufacturer which fails to give notice (to
the bystander) of the danger.3 33 Contributory negligence of the
bystander is not available as a defense, unless the bystander "voluntarily and unreasonably proceed[s] to encounter a known danger, [which would commonly pass] under the name of
assumption of risk."'3 3 4 Even if the tobacco industry would go so

far as to admit that its products represent a danger to the nonsmoking public, which would invite a new wave of restrictive legislation, one could hardly expect nonsmokers to avoid all public
places in an effort to avoid exposure to ETS. One could compare
the situation to a factory that releases toxic emissions into the air;
those who live and work in the area are not voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter the factory's toxic emissions.
X.

CONCLUSION

This article has advanced possible theories plaintiffs may
pursue against tobacco manufacturers, including negligence,
breach of warranty, design defect, misrepresentation, failure to
warn, deception, industry conspiracy, fraudulent concealment
and strict liability due to "unreasonable danger" and risk/utility
analysis. Obviously, success on these theories hinges upon the
Supreme Court's upcoming determination of the preemptive effect of the Labeling Act in the context of Cipollone.
It must be emphasized that this Article does not suggest that
smokers should not stop smoking. Rather, the authors believe
that so long as the federal government supports the continued
existence of an industry which produces a harmful product,
courts should not leave injured plaintiffs without a remedy under
the rubric of implied preemption. Congress has designed the Labeling Act to operate in two contradictory ways-promoting the
economic prosperity of the tobacco industry while warning potential consumers not to smoke. But the industry must not be
able to "sit on its butt," while its advertising negates the federally-mandated health warnings and avoids mention of the addictive qualities and other hazards of tobacco. Products liability law
should be applied to the tobacco industry just as it is to any
other, with the goal of encouraging cigarette manufacturers to
market a safer product, while fully warning of all dangers. If tobacco companies do not take these steps, they should be made to
pay damages for injuries caused by their harmful products.
333 Cf West, 336 So.2d at 89.
334 Id. at 90 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 402 A and 524).

